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MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT AND
UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL: DISREGARDING
THE MORATORIUM?
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA)' was an
ambitious attempt by Congress to "protect, conserve and preserve the
marine mammals of the world." a No nation had previously enacted
such strong legislation in favor of marine mammals.3 Congress
found that such species, facing extinction, must be restored to main-
tain a stable ecosystem. 4 A recent interpretation of the MMPA, how-
ever, limits these animals' protection from their greatest threat: man.
In United States v. Mitchell,5 an American was convicted under the
MMPA of illegally taking dolphins without a permit in the territorial
waters of the Bahamas.6 The trial court7 found him in violation of a
1. Act of Oct. 21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1976).
2. 118 CONG. REc. 25252 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Hollings). "Public concern over
the plight of marine mammals and a complementary public interest in their unique
characteristics generated a broadly based movement to grant them special legislative
protection going far beyond existing wildlife management and endangered species
protection laws." Gaines & Schmidt, Wildlife Population Management under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 6 E.L.R. 50096, 50096 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Gaines & Schmidt]. See generaly Herrington & Regenstein, The Plight of
Ocean Mammals, 1 ENVT'L AFF. 792 (1972). For mammals covered by the MMPA
see Hearings on Marine Mammals Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlfe Con-
servation ofthe House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
57-63 (1971) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. For the current status of marine
mammals, see Dep't of Commerce, Status Report on Mammals, 42 Fed. Reg. 38,981-
39,030 (1977); Dep't of Interior, Report on Marine Mammals, 40 Fed. Reg. 36,582-99
(1975).
3. "The committee considers that the adoption of this bill will place the United
States in a position of world leadership in protection and conservation of marine
mammals." S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (1976).
5. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
6. Seafloor Aquarium, a marine attraction in Nassau, Bahamas, employed Jerry
Mitchell to capture dolphin for eventual export to Great Britain. George Curtis John-
son, Seafloor's owner, obtained a Bahamian work permit for Mitchell. Mitchell was
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National Marine Fishery Service regulation promulgated under the
MMPA.' The Fifth Circuit9 reversed the conviction, holding that
Congress did not intend to hold a United States citizen accountable
under the MMPA if the person is acting within foreign territorial wa-
ters.'" Accordingly, the court found the MMPA regulation void as
overly broad."
The federal government employs several approaches in wildlife
protection." Federal law, for example, imposes penalties for trans-
porting wildlife taken in violation of state, national, or foreign law.' 3
Moreover, certain federal legislation designed to improve the envi-
ronment indirectly promotes wildlife conservation.' 4
convicted of taking 15 dolphin in Bahamian waters from May to August, 1974, and
sentenced to 90 days incarceration and one year's probation. Id at 999.
Charles Fuss, chief of law enforcement for the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) warned Mitchell in 1973 that the MMPA prohibited American citizens from
capturing marine mammals anywhere. He also stated that Seafloor, a foreign facility,
would not be granted a display permit. Id at 998. A second NMFS agent told
Mitchell that he could apply for a permit but not until a Marine Mammal Commis-
sion was appointed. Although Mitchell's lawyer advised him that operations in Baha-
mian waters would be legal, Mitchell subsequently received letters from the NMFS
cautioning him against taking or importing mammals during the MMPA moratorium.
Id See text accompanying note 26 infra for a decription of the moratorium. Mitchell
testified that he understood the NMFS warning of illegality, but acted on advice of
counsel. Id
7. United States v. Mitchell, 6 E.L.R. 20683 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (order denying mo-
tion to dismiss).
8. By 50 C.F.R. § 216.11(c) (1977), it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to take any marine mammal during the moratorium.
See text accompanying note 26 infra. Violation of this regulation is a crime pursuant
to 16 U.S.C. § 1375.
9. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
10. Id at 1005. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text infra.
11. Id
A court may set aside agency action in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or
limitations, under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c)
(1976). Accord, Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969).
12. See generally A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND & RE-
SOURCES ch. 10, 1-33, ch. 18, 1-44 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A. REITZE]; Guilbert,
Wildlfe Preservation under Federal Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at 550-
94 (1974); Dickens, The Law and Endangered Species of Wildlfe, 9 GONZAGA L. REV.
57 (1973); Coggins & Hensley, Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Protect and
Manage Wildlfe." Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered? 61 IOWA L. REV. 1099,
1108-22 (1976).
13. The Lacey Act of 1900, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1976). See A. REITZE, supra note 12,
at ch. 10, 2 (1974).
14. Fish & Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667e (1976) (directs fed-
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The most effective laws name species to be given special protection
under federal statutes' 5 and international agreements. 16 Species en-
eral agencies involved in water resource development to protect wildlife); Anadro-
mous Fish Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-757f (1976) (conserves anadromous
fish resources and protects from water resource development). See, e.g., Udall v.
FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 438 (1970) (Supreme Court invalidated a license to build a hydro-
electric dam; wildlife conservation not explored); Estuarine Areas Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1221-1226 (1976) (protects estuaries for their wildlife and recreational potential)
Id at 1222(a)(1); The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976) (authorizes marine sanctuaries
for conservation and ecological stability and regulates dumping of material in ocean
waters); The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(1976) (protects wildlife habitat by upgrading the environment). For a discussion of
federal law protecting wildlife see Guilbert, Wildlife Preservation under Federal Law,
in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 550 (1974).
15. See, e.g., The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d
(1976); The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1340 (1976). See also The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(1976) (comprehensive legislation protecting all endangered species and their habi-
tats).
Reluctance by Congress to enact legislation regarding specific species is attributed
to uncertain constitutional authority. Dickens, The Law and Endangered Species of
Wildfe, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 57, 66 (1973). The MMPA was enacted by Congress
under the commerce power. U.S. CONST. art. II § 8 cl. 3; 16 U.S.C. § 1361(5) (1976)
commerce clause gives Congress broad powers. Because of MMPA's close connection
with commerce it is not vulnerable to constitutional attack. Cf. Kleppe v. New Mex-
ico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1331-1340 (1976), constitutional under the Property Clause); Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920) (Convention for Protection of Migratory Birds constitutional
under the treaty power). See generally' Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Envi-
ronmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (1974); Coggins & Hensley,
Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Protect and Manage Wildlfe: Is the Endan-
gered Species Act Endangered?, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1099 (1976).
16. See, e.g., The Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16,
1916, United States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628; The Convention for
the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, United States-
Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 1311; The Convention for Protection of Migratory
Birds, March 4, 1972, United States-Japan, [1974] 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990
(treaties enforced by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976)).
See generally Comment, The Migratory' Bird Treaty: Another Feather in the Environ-
mentalist's Cap, 19 S.D. L. REV. 307 (1974).
Additionally, the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals,
Feb. 9, 1957, [1957] 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948 (enforced by the Fur Seal Act of
1966, 16 U.S.C. § 1151-1187 (1976)), prohibits pelagic sealing (taking at sea) off the
Pribiloff Islands of Alaska. For a report on U.S. management of fur seals in the
Pribiloff Islands, see House Hearings, supra note 2, at 272-90. See generally Thomp-
son, Marine Mammals, in A. REITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND
AND RESOURCES ch. 18, 12-16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Thompson]. Although the
MMPA does not abrogate the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention it calls for a reeval-
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dangering conduct is made unlawful by a list of prohibited acts. 7
Violators are subject to civil or criminal penalties under such legisla-
tion.
Recent congressional legislation has focused specifically on marine
mammals.' Due to public concern over diminishing populations
and inhumane treatment,' 9 Congress sought measures of protec-
tion.2" Two basic plans were proposed: "Protectionists" favored an
uation of the Convention. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1383, 1378(b)(1) (1976). Subsequently the
Convention was amended to implement a "sustainable yield" management policy.
1976 Protocol Amending the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific
Fur Seals, art. VI, [1976] 27 U.S.T. 3371, T.I.A.S. No. 8368. However, a "sustainable
yield" program is inconsistent with MMPA policy to maintain marine mammals at an
"optimum sustainable population." 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (1976). Seegeneralv Gaines
& Schmidt, supra note 2, at 50096-50014.
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (IWC) Dec. 2, 1946,
was established to guarantee optimal levels of whale stocks. 62 Stat. 1716 T.I.A.S.
No. 1849, (enforced by the Whaling Convention Act of 1949, 16 U.S.C. §§ 916(a)-(c)
(1976)). For a discussion of the failure of the Convention to protect whales, see
Scarff, The International Management of "hales, Dolphins and Porpoises. An Interdis-
clolinar, Assessment (Part One), 6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 326, 352-427 (1977). For sugges-
tions of modifications of the I.W.C., see id at 618-34. See also The Convention of
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, [1976] 27
U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249 (convention to protect earth's endangered species, im-
plemented by the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 153 l(a)(4)(f) (1976)):
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, [1976] 27 U.S.T. 3918,
T.I.A.S. No. 8409 (Treaty between the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway and
the U.S.S.R. for the protection of polar bears).
17. Specific prohibition sections in direct wildlife protection acts are: Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1976); Free-Roaming Horses and Bur-
ros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538 (1976).
18. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976). Under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), some marine mam-
mals are included in the Fish and Wildlife Service's Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife List. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1977).
19. "The Congress finds that certain species and population stocks of marine
mammals are or may be in danger of extinction or depletion as a result of man's
activities." 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1) (1976). The American public was outraged by televi-
sion documentaries reporting the slaughter of baby harp seals and the extinction of
whale species. Coggins, Legal Protectionfor Marine Mammals: An Overview of Inno-
vaive Resource Conservation Legislation, 6 ENVT'L L. 1, 14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Coggins].
20. Twenty-eight different legislative concepts were introduced by more than 100
members of the House. 118 Cong. Rec. 7687 (1972). For proposed legislation consid-
ered in the Senate, see Ocean Mammal Protection. Hearings on S. 685, S. 1315. S.
2579, S. 2639, S. 2871, S. 3112, & S. 3161 Before the Subcomm. on Ocean and Atmos-
phere ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings]. For the legislative history of the MMPA, see Thompson, supra
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absolute ban on taking any marine mammal,2' whereas "herd man-
agers" would allow takings where the government determined that
the species would not be adversely affected.22 The Marine Mammal
Protection Act emerged,23 imposing a moratorium on takings, which
note 16. at ch. 18 at 19-20; Coggins, supra note 19, at 14-17; Gaines & Schmidt, supra
note 2, at 50103-08.
21. The Harris-Pryor Bills, H.R. 6554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and S. 1315,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), specifically aimed at the North Pacific Fur Seal Conven-
tion, would absolutely prohibit any taking or importation of marine mammals and
would abrogate all international treaties allowing such takings. Twenty-six Senators
and 100 Representatives joined newspapers and environmental groups in supporting
the bills. 118 Cong. Rec. 4,853 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id at 7685 (1972)
(remarks of environmentalists). After the Subcommittee rejected the bill a compro-
mise bill was introduced in the Senate, S. 2579, 92d Cong. 2nd Sess. (1972), to con-
tinue the North Pacific Fur Seal treaty if a new treaty could not be negotiated. See
117 Cong. Rec. 33271-73 (1972).
22. Proponents of the Pelly-Anderson Bill, H.R. 10420, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971). believed certain marine mammal populations were healthy enough to with-
stand continued taking. 117 Cong. Ree. 22805-08 (1971). H.R. 10420 would prohibit
any United States citizen from taking a marine mammal without a permit. H.R. REP.
No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4144. After scientific study, the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce may allow lim-
ited takings or refrain from issuing a permit, thereby creating a de facto moratorium.
However, foreign marine mammal imports could continue. Id at 4157-58. The
Nixon Administration, hunting groups, the fur industry, and certain wildlife groups
supported H.R. 10420. Thompson, supra note 16, at 18-19; 117 Cong. Rec. 44953
(1971).
23. The House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation reported
favorably on H.R. 10420 and rejected bills providing for a fiat ban on taking marine
mammals. See note 21 supra. The subcommittee cited seal over-population problems
occurring on the British Fame Islands after a 20 year total ban on killing. House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 361-62.
Protectionists blocked passage of H.R. 10420 at the end of the first session of the
92nd Congress. 117 Cong. Rec. 44, 947-61 (1971). During the second session, H.R.
10420 was amended to provide a five-year moratorium during which no marine mam-
mal could be taken or imported. 118 Cong. Ree. 7700-04 (1972). H.R. 10420, as
amended, passed the House by an overwhelming majority. Id. at 7684-7716.
After holding hearings, the Senate Subcommittee on Ocean and Atmosphere com-
promised between the management and protectionist positions by approving an
amended version of S. 2871. See Senate Hearings, note 20 supra. As reported, the bill
contained a 15-year moratorium which could be waived after extensive administrative
and public review. 118 Cong. Rec. 25, 246-52 (1972). Takings would be by permit
only. See S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Originally S. 2871 was intro-
duced as a protectionist bill calling for a 10-year total ban, 117 Cong. Rec. 41783-88
(1971) (remarks of Sen. Williams). "Protectionists" unsuccessfully attempted to
amend S. 2871 on the Senate floor to ban administrative waivers of the moratorium
for five years. 118 Cong Rec. 25,272-89 (1972). However, an indefinite moratorium
was substituted for the fifteen year period. S. 2871 passed in June of 1972. 118 Cong
Rec. 25247-25300, 25422-40 (1972). The Senate passed H.R. 10420 after inserting the
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may be waived to maintain species at their optimum sustainable
populations.24
With a few exceptions, 25 the moratorium calls for a complete ces-
sation of taking marine mammals and a ban on the animals' importa-
tion into the United States.26 The MMPA contains prohibitions
which forbid acts of taking, possession, or importation.27 Heavy pen-
alties are imposed for violating any MMPA provision.28
In an early case interpreting the Act, a district court in Fouke Co. v.
Mandel,29 held that the MMPA preempted a Maryland statute
prohibiting importation of seal products.3" But the court cited the
moratorium waiver provision as evidence that importing marine
mammals may be legal." The court concluded that Congress in-
tended to permit takings and importation when it furthered "efficient
text of S. 2871 as an amendment. Id at 2544. A Joint Conference Committee re-
solved conflicts between the two Houses in favor of the Senate Amendment (S. 2871).
Conf. Rep. No. 1488, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4187. The Conference Compromise Bill passed the House and Senate,
118 Cong. Rec. 34637-43 & 34900-01 (1972), and became known as the Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act of 1972, signed by President Nixon on Oct. 21, 1972.
24. The Secretary (see note 27 infra for division of authority under MMPA be-
tween Secretaries of Commerce and Interior) may allow takings and imports of
marine mammals or products by waiving the moratorium for a species, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(3)(A) (1976), prescribing governing regulations, id § 1373; and issuing per-
mits to authorize takings, id, at § 1374. Agency hearings are required at each stage of
the process. Id §§ 1373(d), 1374(d)(2). Any waiver must be approved by the Marine
Mammal Commission and a committee of scientific advisors established by the
MMPA. See generally Gaines & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 50,099. Because of such
strong controls there has only been one waiver, a limited taking of Alaska walrus. 50
C.F.R. § 18.94 (1977). An importation waiver for South Africa seals was invalidated
by a court. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 infra.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (exemption for Alaskan natives); § 1371(a)(1) (scientific
research and public display); § 1371(a)(2) (statutory waiver of moratorium allowing
taking of marine mammals incident to the course of commercial fishing).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1372 (1976).
Authority is split between the Secretary of Commerce (whales, dolphins, porpoises,
seals and sea lions) and the Secretary of the Interior (walruses, polar bear, dugongs
and manatees). See generally Gaines & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 50,097.
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1375, 1376 (1976) (fines up to $20,000 and imprisonment of up to
one year).
29. 386 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Md. 1974).
30. Id at 1358.
31. Id at 1357-58. Use of term "herd management" denotes resource production,
not protection.
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and effective herd management. 32
In Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson,33 the District
of Columbia Circuit declared that the purpose of the MMPA is not to
balance the animals' interests against those of commercial interests,
but rather to provide marine mammals with extensive protection.34
The court invalidated the Commerce Secretary's quota for taking
dolphin incident to tuna fishing operations.35 In Animal Welfare In-
stitute v. Kreps,36 the same court struck down a moratorium waiver
allowing importation of South African seals.37 Again the animals'
interests were of foremost importance. None of these cases decided
whether the MMPA applies extraterritorially.38
32. Id at 1358. The Maryland statute was also preempted by the North Pacific
Fur Seal Act. Id at 1355. A state may adopt laws protecting marine mammals if the
Secretary determines that the law is consistent with the MMPA. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1379(a)(2) (1976). In Fouke v. Mandel, Maryland made no attempt to get approval
from the Secretary of Commerce. 386 F. Supp. at 1360.
33. 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aft'g 414 F. Supp. 297 (D. D.C. 1976).
34. 540 F.2d at 1148. See 118 CONG. REc. 7687 (1972) (remarks of Rep.
Garmatz) ("this legislation is designed to do exactly what its title implies-provide
badly needed protection for mammals").
35. 540 F.2d at 1150. A general permit allowing incidental catches of dolphin
during commercial fishing operations using the purse-seine method was inconsistent
with MMPA. See generall, Nafziger & Armstrong, Porpoise Tuna Controversy.- Man-
agement of Marine Resources after Committee for Humane Resources v. Richardson,
7 ENv. L. 223 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Nafziger & Armstrong]. For Richardson's
impact on fishing industry technology, see Comment, 14 URBAN L. ANN. 263 (1977).
36. 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
37. Id After the District Court denied standing, the Court of Appeals reversed,
ruling that the waiver of the moratorium, 41 Fed. Reg. 7510-12, 7537-40 (1976), vio-
lated 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b)(2) (1976), since some seals were still nursing when killed.
For a discussion of prior attempts by the Fouke Co. to import South African seals, see
Gaines & Schmidt, supra note 2, 50108. Recently the American Fur Industry filed
suit seeking a declaration that § 1372(b)(2) (prohibiting importation of any marine
mammal while nursing, or less than eight months old) is unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of due process. The district Court held on summary judgment that § 1372(b)(2)
is constitutional. Globe Fur Dyeing, Inc. v. United States, No. 78-0693 (D.D.C. Nov.
15, 1978).
38. Some courts have applied environmental laws extra-territorially. See Sierra
Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1976)
(Federal Highway Commission failed to file a sufficient environmental impact state-
ment before building a road from Panama to Colombia); Environmental Defense
Fund v. A.I.D., 6 E.L.R. 20121 (D.D.C. 1975) (A.I.D. failed to prepare a proper envi-
ronmental impact staement for its international pesticide program). See generally
Robinson, Extra-territorial Environmental Protection Obligations of Foreign Affairs
Agencies, The Unfuf#illed Mandate of NEPAW, 7 NYU J. INT. L. & POL. 257-70 (1974);
Note, The Extra-territorial Scope of NEP,4 's Environmental Impact Statement Require-
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United States v. Mitchell39 was the first case to address the issue.
The Fifth Circuit held that the MMPA does not extend to Americans
taking marine mammals in foreign waters.4" It was conceded that
United States authority over its citizens may apply extraterritorially if
Congress so intends.4 The court, however, found no geographical
scope in the moratorium provision,42 and held that the prohibitions
ment, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349 (1975). For extraterritorial application of state environ-
mental law, see Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d
337 (5th Cir. 1967).
39. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 6 E.L.R. 20683 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
40. 553 F.2d at 1005.
41. "The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the legislative authority of the
United States over its citizens extends to conduct by Americans on the high seas and
even within the territory of sovereigns." 553 F.2d at 1001. Accord, Steele v. Bulova
Watch, 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (U.S. citizens in Mexico are subject to U.S. trademark
regulation); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (U.S. employers in Iran may
be subject to U.S. labor laws if Congress so intends); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 U.S. 377 (1948) (U.S. citizens in Bermuda are subject to the Fair Labor Standards
Act); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1940) (U.S. citizens in the Gulf of Mexico are
subject to Florida sponge protection laws); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421
(1932) (U.S. citizens in France subject to U.S. contempt power); Cook v. Tait, 265
U.S. 47 (1934) (U.S. citizens in Mexico subject to federal income tax laws); United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (U.S. citizen on the high seas and in Brazil
liable for fraud against the Federal government).
The question in these cases is not whether Congress has the authority to extend the
law extraterritorially, but whether it so intended. In determining the intent behind
the MMPA the Mitchell court applied a rule of statutory construction, holding that
where a limitation of the Act's application to a strictly territorial jurisdiction would
"curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for
frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at
home. . . the locus of the law shall include the high seas and foreign countries." 553
F.2d at 1002, citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). The Mitchell
court ruled that conservation legislation does not compel application to other terri-
tory. See note 45 infra. When a law does not compel extraterritorial effect, a pre-
sumption arises against such application. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98
(1922); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 38 (1965) (Reporter's Note 1). To overcome such a presumption, a clear ex-
pression of Congressional intent must be shown. Accord, Steele v. Bulova Watch, 344
U.S. 280, 285 (1952); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Judge Wisdom
in Mitchell felt that restricting the territorial scope of the Act would not greatly curtail
the scope and usefulness of the statute in violation of Bowman. 553 F.2d at 1003. But
see notes 53-63 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the conflict of laws
approach to the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental law, see Note, Er-
traterritorialApplication of United States Laws." A Conflict ofLaws Approach, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 1005, 1022-24, 1035-36 (1976).
42. 553 F.2d at 1002. The Mitchell court concluded that the legislative intent be-
hind the moratorium was simply to deny the secretary authority to issue permits ex-
cept in certain circumstances. Id.
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restrict MMPA coverage to United States waters43 and the high
seas." The decision presumed that conservation statutes are based
on sovereign control over natural resources, 45 and therefore, only in-
43. 553 F.2d at 1004-05. "It is unlawful for any person or vessel or other convey-
ance to take any marine mammal in waters or on land under the Jurisdiction of the
United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A) (1976). For purposes of the MMPA, U.S.
waters now include the 200-mile fishing zone. Id § 1362(15). See note 57 infra.
44. 553 F.2d at 1004-05. "[I]t is unlawful: (1) for any person subject to the Juris-
diction of the United States. . .to take any marine mammal on the high seas." 16
U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1) (1976). Although there was substantial dispute over the reach of
"High Seas" it was agreed at trial that for purposes of MMPA, high seas exclude the
territorial waters of sovereign states, 553 F.2d at 1005 n.15. The dispute arises be-
cause there is an international and domestic meaning to the term. Internationally,
high seas are all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State. Convention of the High Seas [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. 5200 (1962). The international definition is only used when the United States
is concerned with its jurisdiction and sovereignty in relation to another state. The
domestic definition, that high seas means waters seaward of the low water line, was
developed by Justice Story in DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 427 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass.
1815). The United States took jurisdiction over a murder on a United States ship in a
Japanese harbor and stated "the term 'high seas' includes waters on the sea coast
without the boundaries of the low water mark; and the waters of the port of
Yokahama constitute high seas." In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 471 (1890). Likewise, a
vessel anchored in the harbor of South Vietnam was determined to be on the high
seas. United States v. Ross, 439 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1971). Accord, United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1932); U.S. v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893); Nixon v.
United States, 352 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1965). See Death on High Seas Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 716 (1970) (. . .on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
state, or the District of Columbia, or territorie5 of the United States); Protection of
Sea Otters on High Seas Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1171 (1970) (unlawful . . .to engage in
taking of sea otters on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of the United
States).
45. 553 F.2d at 1002. Thus, the Mitchell Court created a new presumption of
legislative intent: "When Congress considers environmental legislation it presumably
recognizes the authority of other sovereigns to protect or exploit their own resources."
Id See United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources 1803 (XVII) reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
223-26; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 17 (1965). See gen-
erally Taft, 3rd U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, Major Unresolved Fisheries Issues,
14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 112, 114-17 (1975). The Supreme Court has held that the
high seas are international waters not subject to the dominion of any single nation.
United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975). Thus the United States has no jurisdic-
tional control over resources in the high seas. Since the MMPA does control the
actions of United States citizens on the high seas, jurisdiction must be based on the
nationality of the citizen rather than subject matter control over the animals.
Applying the MMPA extraterritorially would not prevent foreign nations from
utilizing marine mammals as resources. They would only be prevented from employ-
ing Americans without U.S. permission. For the possibility of granting permits to
U.S. citizens in such instances, see note 50 infra.
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ternational agreements may extend the scope of the MMPA.4 6
The Fifth Circuit, however, failed to properly construe legislative
intent.47 The moratorium on takings of marine mammals by United
States citizens remains in effect unless waived.48 No one may take a
marine mammal without a permit during the moratorium. 49 The
MMPA expressly applies to the worldwide marine environment and
to foreign governments," and National Marine Fisheries Service reg-
46. "The traditional method of resolving such differences is through negotiation
and agreement rather than through the imposition of one particular choice by a state's
imposing its law extraterritorially." 553 F.2d at 1002. Contra, Steele v. Bulova
Watch, 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (a U.S. company relied on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1115-1127 (1976), to prevent patent infringements by a U.S. citizen in Mexico al-
though a purpose of the statute was to provide rights and remedies through treaties
and conventions respecting trademarks).
For a discussion of the failure of international agreements to protect marine mam-
mals, see Thompson, supra note 16, at 18; Herrington & Regenstein, The Plight of
Ocean Mammals, 1 ENVT'L AFF. 792 (1972).
47. The moratorium's geographic scope should be unlimited: "The purpose of this
legislation is to prohibit the harassing, catching and killing of marine mammals by
U.S. citizens or within the jurisdiction of the United States unless taken under the
authority of a permit issued by an agency of the executive branch." H.R. REP. No.
767, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4144. Accord, S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). The Mitchell court
found no legislative intent prohibiting the extraterritorial killing of, for example, Ca-
nadian baby harp seals. 553 F.2d at 1004. Judge Wisdom did not look very closely:
"To remove any doubt of the controversy in this bill S. 2871. . . .This is a complete
prohibition against the killing of baby seals." 118 CONG. REc. 25268 (1972) (remarks
of Sen. Hollings). Accord, Nafziger & Armstrong, supra note 35, at 271 ("The Act
contemplates its application to all persons, vessels and conveyances subject to United
States jurisdiction, which would include nationals or boats with sufficient American
ties, wherever situated").
Permits are issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service to allow takings in
foreign waters. 47 Fed. Reg. 33786 (1977) (Hudson Bay, Canada); 43 Fed. Reg. 42776
(1978) (Greenland).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976); see Coggins, supra note 19, at 24-25.
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371, 1374 (1976). "With the single exception of Eskimos and
Alaskan natives, no U.S. citizen will be permitted to capture, harass or kill a marine
mammal without. . . permission." 117 CONG. REC. 44951 (1971) (remarks of Rep.
Dingell).
50. "Marine mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great interna-
tional significance. . . , it is the sense of Congress that they should be protected and
encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible. . . and that the primary objec-
tive should be to maintain the health of the marine ecosystem." 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6)
(1976).
"Today I call up for Senate Consideration S. 2871, the bill to protect, conserve and
preserve the marine mammals of the world, specifically those under the jurisdiction of
the United States as well as those which are now being taken by the citizens of other
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ulations reflect the MMPA's unlimited geographic reach." Use of
the term "high seas" in the prohibitions without explanation was
faulty legislative drafting. 2
The Mitchell court creates a new exception to the MMPA morato-
rium. United States citizens may take marine mammals in foreign
waters with impunity provided they obtain the consent of the accom-
modating government. 3 These animals may be lawfully imported
into the United States54 or sold in another country." This result con-
nations in international and territorial waters. 118 CONG. REC. 25252 (1972) (re-
marks of Sen. Hollings).
The MMPA applies to foreign governments: No marine mammals may be im-
ported into the U.S. unless the program for taking marine mammals in the country of
origin is consistent with the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(A) (1976). The MMPA also
imposes a ban on the importation of all fish and products taken in violation of the
Act. Id § 137 1(a)(2). See general' Nafziger & Armstrong, supra note 35 at 273.
Foreign display facilities may apply for a permit to take marine mammals in U.S.
waters. A permit will be granted only after adequate assurances of care and mainte-
nance of the animal. See 42 Fed. Reg. 58581 (1977) (government policy statement on
foreign display facilities). The dolphins caught by defendant Mitchell were exported
to Great Britain. Since the United States issues permits to foreign facilities to take
mammals in American waters and issues permits to domestic display facilities to take
mammals in foreign waters, a British display institution should be allowed to apply
for a permit to employ an American to take a marine mammal in foreign waters. See
note 47 supra.
51. 50 C.F.R. § 216.11(c) (1977). See note 8 supra.
The National Marine Fishery Service hailed Mitchell's conviction: "The successful
prosecution of these individuals reinforces NMFS's interpretation of the Act, to the
effect that U.S. citizens are subject to the provisions of the Act, regardless of the geo-
graphic location of their marine mammal activities, and regardless of such activities
under a foreign state's law." Dep't of Commerce, Status of Marine Mammals, 42 Fed.
Reg. 38981, 38988 (1977).
52. See Nafziger & Armstrong, supra note 35, at 224. All bills considered by
Congress utilized the same standard prohibition using the term High Seas. Nowhere
in the statute is it defined. A recommendation to define "High Seas" as waters sea-
ward of the territorial sea of the United States went unheeded. U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF H.R. 10420 reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4170-71. A rule of statutory construction holds that the intention of an
Act will prevail over the literal sense of its terms. Thus limited words in one part of
an Act may be expanded by general words in another part if the general words more
nearly express the Congressional intent. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, 82 (4th Ed. 1973). The moratorium is descirbed as a com-
plete cessation. See note 26 supra; Gaines & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 50098.
53. "The basic purpose of the moratorium, prohibitions and permit system there-
fore appears to be protection of marine mammals only within the territory of the
United States and on the High Seas." 553 F.2d at 1003.
54. Regarding importation, the prohibitions state: "It is unlawful to import into
the United States (1) any marine mammal which was taken in violation of this sub-
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fficts with Congressional intent since United States nationals may
now endanger marine mammals in the worldwide environments. 56
Recently, United States and several other nations57 have estab-
lished fishery zones extending up to 200 miles from the territorial sea.
Nations claim exclusive management over resources, including
marine mammals, in these areas.58 Under the Mitchell rationale of
sovereign control,59 the MMPA would not apply in these large ocean
areas, which contain substantial marine mammal populations.'"
chapter." 16 U.S.C. § 1372(c)(1)(A) (1976). A U.S. citizen taking mammals in for-
eign waters does not violate the Act; therefore the animal or its products may be
imported. However, prohibitions remain against importation of pregnant or nursing
mammals, §§ 1372(b)(1), (2), mammals taken from a depleted species, § 1372(b)(3), or
mammals taken in an inhumane manner, § 1372(b)(4).
55. Mitchell exported the captured dolphin to Great Britain. 553 F.2d at 997.
56. See notes 19 and 47 supra.
57. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1976). Congress enacted this legislation to conserve all fishery resources within a
200-mile area adjacent to the territorial sea in advance of a United Nations Third
Law of the Sea Conference treaty allowing nations to create such "economic zones."
Additionally, many nations are extending their territorial seas, areas in which they
may claim complete sovereignty, from three to twelve miles offshore. Informal Com-
posite Negotiating Text U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP 10, Art. 3 July 15, 1977, repeated
at 16 I.L.M. 1108, 1121 (1977) [hereinafter cited as I.C.N.T.]; see H.R. REP. No. 445,
94th Cong., 28 (1975) reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 601.
("A consensus is evidently emerging ... that new international law should recognize
an extension of all nations' territorial waters from three to twelve miles offshore, with
coastal states allowed to establish an 'economic zone' of jurisdiction extending at least
200 miles offshore").
58. MMPA defines waters under the Jurisdiction of the United States as including
the 200-mile zone, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(15) (1976). According to the informal Negotiat-
ing Composite Text drafted at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
in New York 1977, nations will exercise substantial rights in such areas: "In the exclu-
sive economic zone, the coastal state has: (a) Sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether
living or not living of the sea bed, and subsoil. . ." I.C.N.T., supra note 57, at Art.
56(l)(a), 1135. The United States has recognized the right of nations to establish
economic zones. See, e.g., Fisheries Agreement Between United States of America
and Mexico. - U.S.I. -, T.I.A.S. 8853. Control over marime mammals is as com-
plete in the economic zone as in territorial waters.
59. See note 45 supra. "When Congress considers environmental legislation it
presumably recognizes the authority of other sovereigns to protect and exploit their
own resources." 553 F.2d at 1002.
60. An argument can be made that, for purposes of the MMPA, high seas do not
reach 200-mile economic zones. The Mitchell Court states: "Each sovereign may reg-
ulate the exploitation of natural resources within its territory." 553 F.2d 1002. Eco-
nomic zones have both the attributes of traditional high seas (freedom of navigation)
and territorial seas (sovereignty over living resources). The United States considers
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Additionally, United States corporate activity in foreign nations is
beyond the reach of the MMPA.6" Researchers can take marine
mammals in foreign waters for use in experiments otherwise prohib-
ited in the United States.6" Scientists may move to foreign countries
to avoid long delays in research permit approval.63 Only adequate
conservation measures by other nations can prevent depletion of
marine mammals by Americans.
its 200-mile conservation zone as high seas. The term "high seas" means all waters
beyond the territorial sea of the United States and beyond any nation's territorial sea.
16 U.S.C. § 1802(13) (1976). Congress so defined high seas because of a fear that
other nations would see its action as an unwarranted exercise of sovereignty and a
breach of good faith negotiations at the Third Law of the Sea Conference.
The latest negotiating text of the United Nations Third Law of the Sea Conference
describes high seas as "all ports of the sea that are not included in the exclusive eco-
nomic, in the territorial sea, or in internal waters of a state." I.C.N.T., supra note 57,
at Art. 86, 1144. However, all nations are given the rights of navigation and over-
flight, which are traditional high seas rights. I.C.N.T., supra note 57, at Art. 58, 1135.
For a discussion of whether the exclusive economic zone proposed at the Third Law
of the Sea Conference is high seas, see Fleischer, The Right to a 200-Mile Exclusive
Economic Zone or Special Fisher, Zone, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 548, 552-70 (1977);
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The 1977 New
York Session, 72 AM. J. OF INT. L. 57, 67-72 (1978). Such large areas of sea beyond
the coverage of the MMPA would create a huge loophole. Most marine mammal
species exist within 200 miles of coast. Scarff, The International Management of
Wales Dolphins and Porpoises: An Interdiscplinarv Assessment (Part Two) 6 ECOL-
oGY L.Q. 575, 613 (1977). For worldwide distributions of marine mammals, see
Dep't of Commerce, Status of Marine Mammals, 42 Fed. Reg. 38,981, 38,993-39,026
(1977). Dep't of Interior Report on Marine Mammals, 40 Fed. Reg. 36,582, 36,588-
36,596 (1975).
61. American corporations may operate in foreign nations and produce marine
mammal products immune from United States control. Cf Steele v. Bulova Watch,
344 U.S. 280 (1952) (American citizen manufacturing watches in Mexico found sub-
ject to the Lanham Act, prohibiting trademark infringement); Branch v. Federal
Trade Commission, 141 F.2d 131 (1944) (Congress prevents unfair trade practices in
foreign commerce.)
For a conflict of laws approach to the extraterritorial application of United States
law, see Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws.4 Conflict of Laws
.4pproach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (1976).
62. Under the MMPA, a United States citizen working for an academic institu-
tion, a display institution or a foreign government performing research activities or
capturing animals for display, may be in violation of the Act, even though within the
law of the local jurisdiction. Marine Mammal Protection Oversight Hearings before the
Subcomm on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the Comm.
on Merchant Marine Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160, 162 (1976).
63. For problems in time delays for permit approval, see id at 293-304. For a
report on enforcement problems in administering the MMPA, see id at 252-67. For a
discussion of 1976 enforcement activity, see Dep't of Commerce, Status of Marine
Mammals, 42 Fed. Reg. 38981, 38987-88 (1977).
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The MMPA imposes a moratorium upon destructive acts of Amer-
icans. The moratorium concept is a novel and necessary approach to
wildlife protection. The federal government no longer considers
marine mammals natural resources subject to ownership and ex-
ploitation. The United States cannot condone unregulated takings by
its citizens anywhere in the marine environment. Congress must
amend the MMPA to clarify the Act's unlimited reach.
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